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Abstract—Web-based or hybrid mobile applications (apps) are
widely used and supported by various modern hybrid app devel-
opment frameworks. In this architecture, any JavaScript code,
local or remote, can access available APIs, including JavaScript
bridges provided by the hybrid framework, to access device
resources. This JavaScript inclusion capability is dangerous, since
there is no mechanism to determine the origin of the code to
control access, and any JavaScript code running in the mobile
app can access the device resources through the exposed APIs.
Previous solutions are either limited to a particular platform (e.g.,
Android) or a specific hybrid framework (e.g., Cordova) or only
protect the device resources and disregard the sensitive elements
in the web environment. Moreover, most of the solutions require
the modification of the base platform.
In this paper, we present HybridGuard, a novel policy en-
forcement framework that can enforce principal-based, state-
ful policies, on multiple origins without modifying the hybrid
frameworks or mobile platforms. In HybridGuard, hybrid app
developers can specify principal-based permissions, and define
fine-grained, and stateful policies that can mitigate a significant
class of attacks caused by potentially malicious JavaScript code
included from third-party domains, including ads running inside
the app. HybridGuard also provides a mechanism and policy
patterns for app developers to specify fine-grained policies for
multiple principals. HybridGuard is implemented in JavaScript;
therefore, it can be easily adapted for other hybrid frameworks
or mobile platforms without modification of these frameworks or
platforms. We present attack scenarios and report experimental
results to demonstrate how HybridGuard can thwart attacks
against hybrid mobile apps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web-based mobile application (app) development is a
technology to develop mobile apps using the web platform
(i.e., HTML and JavaScript). Different from regular mobile app
development–where the code is written in a native programming
language such as Java for Android–the core business code of
web-based mobile apps is written in JavaScript and HTML as
webpages. The HTML and JavaScript code is then included
into a regular mobile app for a particular platform automatically
by a middle-tier web-based development framework such as
Cordova (https://cordova.apache.org/). Since these web-based
mobile apps contain web code (written by developers) and
code in a native programming language (normally generated
by a framework), they are also known as hybrid mobile apps.
Hybrid technology allows mobile apps to be write-once-run-
everywhere [23], saving time and human resources required
for the development process by generating the same app for
different mobile platforms (e.g., Android and iOS) with a single
development process. Write-once-run-everywhere substantially
increases revenue for developers because a hybrid app can
reach more users in different platforms with less effort. Such
advantages render web-based mobile app development a perva-
sive trend in the mobile industry. In April 2015, a survey of 178
IT organizations revealed that 65% organizations prefer to use
hybrid frameworks for mobile app development [28]. Besides
Cordova as the most popular one, there are more than seventy
such hybrid app frameworks [6] released in the last few years
such as Ionic (http://ionicframework.com), Onsen (http://onsen.
io), Intel-XDX (https://software.intel.com/en-us/intel-xdk), and
Sencha Touch (https://www.sencha.com/products/touch), to
name just a few. Only a few months back in July 2016,
Facebook released React Native [9], a JavaScript library that
is anticipated to be the future of hybrid app development due
to its high performance, ability to provide a highly responsive
and fluid-like UI, and third-party plug-in compatibility.
Unfortunately, the advent of web-based mobile application
technology only exacerbates the security problems of mobile
apps. A recent large-scale study of nearly one million web-
based mobile apps revealed that 28% of them (i.e., about
280,000 apps) have at least one vulnerability that attackers
can exploit to launch serious cyber-attacks [27]. Various other
studies have demonstrated that web-based mobile apps expose
the device to web-based vulnerabilities, which do not exist in
typical native mobile apps [11], [12], [18], [19]. For example,
hybrid mobile apps are vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks
that can access the device resources and steal user’s sensitive
information [18].
In hybrid mobile apps, the core business code is implemented
in JavaScript and executed within an embedded browser. There
are JavaScript “bridge” APIs, typically provided by hybrid
2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops
© 2017, Phu H. Phung. Under license to IEEE.
DOI 10.1109/SPW.2017.34
147
frameworks, that allow the business JavaScript code to interact
with the native code to access the device resources and
functionalities such as geolocation, contact lists, SMS, and
others. The permission model in mobile platforms (i.e., grant
all or nothing) is too coarse-grained to prevent the misuse of
the JavaScript bridges. For example, let us consider a benign,
free hybrid app that has been downloaded to a device and
granted permission to access the device resources such as
geolocation and SMS. As a norm, this free app includes
advertisements (ads) to gain revenue as in the common ad
revenue business model [34]. These ads are usually written
in JavaScript and other web technologies, and therefore have
access to all the available JavaScript bridges [39]. Some hybrid
frameworks such as Cordova, provide a whitelist mechanism
to prevent access to and from untrusted domains. Content
Security Policy (CSP) [26] can be used in hybrid apps to
prevent code injection attacks and untrusted external JavaScript
code execution. However, these mechanisms do not apply in
the ad revenue model since the developer must allow the ad
code to run by whitelisting its domain. Usually, the ads are
checked by a very thorough screening process to ensure that
they are safe, however, the process is not air-tight. In practice,
there have been many incidents in the past where malicious
ads have made it through the screening process to the users’
smartphones [38]. There have also been cases where the entire
ad network was compromised, and malicious ads were supplied
to the user’s devices [2], [17], [8]. By default, any JavaScript
code running inside a hybrid app has access to these JavaScript
bridges if the user has granted the required permissions [3].
As there is no mechanism to prevent JavaScript code from
accessing the JavaScript bridges [39], malicious ads (JavaScript)
can e.g., steal users’ sensitive information such as geolocation,
contact lists transfer the data through phone channels such
as SMS. Adapting existing JavaScript security solutions (e.g.,
[31], [21], [1], [37], [30], [20], [40], [24], [32], [16]) is not
straightforward because JavaScript bridges are different from
the regular JavaScript APIs in the web, and there are many
phone-related channels such as SMS that cannot be captured
by regular web security solutions or CSP (We will discuss in
more detail about this in Section VIII).
Security issues of hybrid mobile apps recently get more
attention from the research community. However, these research
studies in hybrid mobile app security face at least one of the
following significant limitations. Some solutions focus on a
specific platform (e.g., WebView in Android), therefore they
do not work on other platforms [39], [13]. A few other works
provide platform-dependent solutions and focus on a specific
hybrid framework such as PhoneGap by modifying them [12],
[19]. Some of the solutions provide principal-based access
control for device resources [13], however, they do not protect
users’ sensitive information stored in the web environment.
PhoneWrap [11] can protect both device resources and users’
information but cannot enforce different policies for multiple
principals or origins.
In this work, we propose a robust, and extensible policy
enforcement framework for hybrid mobile apps that fills the
gaps in the literature mentioned above. Using our HybridGuard
framework, developers can define principal-based fine-grained
permissions for different origins and can enforce fine-grained,
stateful policies to prevent potential cyber-attacks as discussed
earlier. The policies will be defined at the development
stage in the web code and can be enforced at runtime. By
injecting policy code before deployment, our techniques can
precisely monitor all web code to ensure its security. The main
contributions of our work include:
• We develop a robust framework for hybrid mobile app
developers to specify and enforce useful security policies
to protect the users from potential cyber-attacks.
• We develop a novel principal-based permission access
control and fine-grained security policy specification for
hybrid mobile apps.
• We provide a wide-range of security policy patterns that
can be enforced in hybrid mobile apps to prevent real-
world attacks.
• We report a small-scale experimental evaluation of our
proposed framework on Android and iOS platforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents the background for our work including the
hybrid mobile app architecture. In Section III, we identify
the threat model and present motivating attack scenarios.
Section IV introduces the overview of our technical approach.
The implementation of our framework is detailed in Section V,
where we also analyze the security properties our proposed
framework. Section VI classifies different policies patterns. We
report our experimental results in Section VII. Related work
is discussed in Section VIII and conclusion and discussion of
our work is presented in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hybrid Mobile Applications
A hybrid mobile app is built using web technologies –
developers uses a hybrid app framework to build the app
once using technologies such as HTML5, CSS and JavaScript,
and the framework provides mechanisms to instantly port to
various mobile platforms such as iOS, Android, Windows
Phone and others. The core business code of the app is written
in JavaScript and housed in a native container. The framework
supplies the app with necessary native code for API access to
the device resources. The ability to create a “write-once-run-
anywhere” app, with the capability of device access provides
the mobile developer unprecedented simplicity and flexibility,
simultaneously affording him the superior functionality and user
experience of native apps. An attractive advantage is that the
developer need not familiarize himself with tools or the skill-set
required for developing for a specific native platform [14].
Fig. 1 describes the basic architecture of a hybrid mobile app,
in the style of recent related work [13]. The embedded web
browser is used as a container to render web content, which can
include local web code, remote web code located on the app’s
web server, and third-party web code such as advertisements or
other external JavaScript code. The mobile platform provides
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Fig. 1: Architecture of web-embedded mobile apps.
an infrastructure for the web content inside the app’s embedded
browser to communicate with device resources, such as the
microphone, camera, contact list, etc., through bridge code,
which consists of web APIs and native APIs.
The embedded browser provides web APIs (HTML5 and
JavaScript APIs) for the app’s web content to communicate
with the native APIs of the device. For example, naviga-
tor.geolocation is a read-only property of the web API
navigator which returns a Geolocation object that gives the
web content access to the device’s location. The web APIs
also allow the web code to manipulate the web content objects
– Document Object Model (DOM).
Native APIs are provided by the underlying operating
system and allow the app’s web content, via the web APIs,
to access the device resources. In Android, native APIs are in
Java, and in iOS they are in Objective C [15]. For instance,
android.preference is a native API that provides classes that
manage application preferences and implement the preferences
UI. The android.preference.CheckBoxPreference class is
used to provide checkbox widget functionality in an app.
B. Security in Hybrid Mobile Applications
Apache Cordova, one of the most widely used hybrid mobile
app frameworks, has certain security mechanisms in place to
reduce the attack surface.
1) Domain Whitelisting: Cordova provides this security
mechanism where developers can configure a security policy
to define which external domains can be accessed by the
hybrid app. The default setting allows access to any external
domain [5]. However, this whitelist mechanism is not applicable
for third-party JavaScript code within a whitelisted webpage,
e.g., the local webpage.
2) Iframes: If content is served in an iframe from a
whitelisted domain, that domain will have access to the Cordova
bridges. Therefore, if the app developer whitelists a third-party
advertising network and serves those ads through an iframe, it
is possible that a malicious ad could break out of the iframe
and perform malicious actions. Cordova advises not to use
iFrames for this reason [4].
3) Content Security Policy (CSP): CSP support is a native
browser capability that allows a developer to control exactly
what content his app can access and at a very granular level.
CSP is applied at page level for hybrid mobile apps by using
a meta tag. By default, applying a CSP disables both eval()
and inline scripts. Only domains defined in the CSP meta tag
can be used to load scripts from or communicating back from
the app. However, as CSP can only allow or disallow a certain
domain, this makes it coarse-grained. If the app developer
wants to load a third-party JavaScript, he has to whitelist this
third-party domain using the CSP meta but there is no way for
the developer to control the behavior of the third-party code,
which can be potential malicious.
III. THREAT MODEL AND RUNNING ATTACK SCENARIOS
A. Threat Model
In this work, we consider the scenarios that hybrid mobile
apps are legitimate and trusted by the users. We assume that
code injection attacks in hybrid apps [18] are prevented by the
Content Security Policy (CSP) [26] mechanism. The in-scope
threats we consider come from third-party JavaScript code that
the developers include in the hybrid apps. To function correctly,
these included scripts must be allowed in CSP by the developers.
However, once included in the apps, third-party JavaScript
code has the same privileges as the first-party code and the
developers have no mechanism to control their behaviors. In
this model, the third-party JavaScript could possibly be (1)
benign but may be under control of an attacker through e.g.,
a SQL injection or network attack on the third-party server,
or (2) malicious by intentions e.g., by luring the developers
to use its appealing functionalities. In the next subsection, we
list several motivating attack scenarios from this threat model.
B. Running Attack Scenarios
1) Misuse of mobile device resources: Consider a hybrid
mobile app that requires access to device resources such as
geolocation, SMS, Camera, Gallery, and File Storage. By
default, after a user grants the required permissions (could be at
the installation time or on the fly), any JavaScript code running
inside the application has access to these device resources [3].
If a third-party domain, which has been whitelisted by the
developer, is infected with malicious code controlled by an
attacker, the malicious code can access all the device resources
that the app has access to. For example, the malicious code can
access the device’s photo library or access the device’s camera
to capture the user’s actions live. In addition, the malicious code
can also manipulate the DOM of the hosting page including
the creation of new elements or the modification of existing
elements.
2) Sensitive information leakage: The malicious JavaScript
running inside a hybrid app can also read the user’s sensitive
information including device resources such as contact lists,
file storage and personal information such as social security
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number that may be available on the hosting page. Although
the Content Security Policy mechanism disallows information
to be sent to any external domain not in the whitelist, any app
with access to APIs such as SMS and Email can use these
channels to leak the stolen sensitive information.
3) UI attacks: These attacks are known as clickjacking in
the web or touchjacking on smartphones [29]. Leveraging the
ability to create new elements in the hosting page as mentioned
previously, malicious JavaScript code in a hybrid app can
launch these attack by creating an invisible interface e.g., an
iframe on top of the app interface. When the user touch on
the app, he actually touch on the invisible interface, which can
lead to download a malicious application to the phone.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Overview
Our enforcement mechanism allows hybrid mobile app
developers to include each script code written in a *.js file
under a principal, which is the core for policy definition and
enforcement. As we mentioned in the attack scenarios, third-
party code is potentially malicious. Instead of including third-
party code directly into the main webpage of the hybrid app,
we provide an interface to load the third-party code under a
principal named by the developer for tracking purpose. The
developer can also load local JavaScript files under a named
principal so that he can define fine-grained policies for that
trusted principal as well. We manage the principal at runtime
so that all API calls from a principal can be tracked.
The second part of our framework is the monitor to control
the API execution. Our monitor will intercept security-relevant
API calls including access to the device resources and the
DOM. By deploying the monitor, any calls to the intercepted
APIs will be marked by a principal and checked by the monitor
code. The monitor code will invoke the policy engine to decide
whether to grant or deny the call based on the defined policies.
B. Inclusion of JavaScript Code
The conventional JavaScript code inclusion is through
<script> tag, which causes security issues as discussed previ-
ously. Our goal is to execute each JavaScript program (in a .js
file) under a principal so that the code execution will be marked
with that principal at runtime. As a result, we can differentiate
which principal calls a certain API. To achieve this, we provide
a new API call to load and execute a JavaScript program
file. This API allows the developer to assign a principal to a
JavaScript program and execute it without using conventional
JavaScript inclusion. At runtime, any code execution from this
program is marked with the assigned principal so that the
policy engine can enforce principal-based policies.
C. Principal Management and Tracking
JavaScript code is loaded and executed in sequence, in
order of appearance and “run-to-completion” [10]. However,
at runtime, the code can be generated and executed on the
fly. This code includes the one generated dynamically or the
code embedded into event handlers. In web-based mobile app
scenarios, there might be a trusted principal (local code) and
multiple third-party principals. Therefore, we must manage
the principals and track them when the context is changed
due to dynamic code generation and event triggers. We use a
local principal stack to keep track of the various principals at
runtime as the code is in the execution sequence. Whenever a
JavaScript code is executed by our interface, its principal is
pushed to the stack. When the code terminates, the principal is
popped from the stack. For dynamic code generation and event
handlers, we catch them explicitly and execute them under
the same principal that generates the code. When the dynamic
code or event handlers run, we are still able to attribute their
principal to enforce policy for the corresponding principal.
D. API Interception
HybridGuard enforces security policies based on principal
and its calls to JavaScript APIs in web-based mobile apps.
These APIs include device resource accesses and DOM
operations. We intercept these API calls by wrapping them
and checking the policy to determine if a call is allowed
or not. Our interception and policy code is implemented in
one single JavaScript file and included in a <script> tag in
the main HTML right after the JavaScript “bridge” APIs file
(e.g., cordova.js for Cordova framework). When executed,
it mediates all guarded JavaScript “bridge” APIs and DOM
APIs and then loads the required JavaScript code including the
local code as well as any remote, and third-party code that the
developer intends to include in the app. Loading the JS code
through our interface guarantees that this code cannot access
any resource via the original APIs but via our mediated APIs
so that we can control the execution based on defined policies.
E. Principal-based Permission and Fine-grained Security Poli-
cies
Our goal is to develop an enforcement framework that
allows developers to specify rules on how JavaScript code
from different principals and parties interact with device
resources and user’s sensitive information. To this end, our
policy specification supports the following.
a) Principal-based Permission: We extended the permis-
sion model in mobile architecture with principals. For each
resource access or action, the developer can define which
principal can be granted the access. We support not only
allowed/denied for each principal per resource but also provide
access qualifiers such as read, write, and create. We also
support policy input such as whitelist and bound in this
permission specification, which will be used to check fine-
grained policies.
b) Stafeful and Fine-grained Security Policies: Some
policies cannot be expressed in a static permission or access
control rules. For example, to prevent potential information
leakage to protect the users, the developer might want to enforce
a policy that disallows SMS send if an untrusted principal has
accessed the geolocation API. Our enforcement mechanism
allows the developer to define local security states based on
principals and to update the state so that such stateful and
fine-grained policies can be enforced at runtime.
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c) Custom Policies: Since our framework is written in
JavaScript, the developer can express any custom policies that
can not be generalized in rules. For example, to prevent a
touchjacking attack mentioned in the attack scenarios (c.f.
Section III), the developer needs to intercept the UI actions
and check if it violates certain rules.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 2: Conceptual architecture of our proposed framework.
The overview of our framework is illustrated in Fig. 2. A
JavaScript program written in a .js file will be loaded under
a principal by our new API so that any invocation from the
code is marked by that principal at runtime. Any invocation
to the guarded APIs will be forwarded to the monitor, which
consults the policy manager to check permission and then
security policies. If there is no violation, the invocation is
allowed and passed to the original API. In this section, we
describe the technical details of our implementation of the
approach introduced in the previous section.
A. Custom Script Execution with Principal
As discussed, the origin of JavaScript code in hybrid
mobile apps is not propagated therefore the app devel-
oper cannot enforce policy rules based on the real origin
of the invocation [39]. To solve this issue, we introduce
and implement a new JavaScript API loadJSwithPrinci-
pal(p, url) to replace the conventional script inclusion.
The app developer can use this API to load and exe-
cute a JavaScript file, local or remote, described in the
url argument under a principal p. For example, instead
using <script src="http://example.com/ad.js"></script>
to load the external JavaScript from example.com, the app
developer can use the loadJSwithPrincipal(..) to load the
code under a principal “example.com” as loadJSwithPrin-
cipal("example.com", "http://example.com/ad.js");.
We adapted a previous approach [31] to implement this
loadJSwithPrincipal API. Different from the previous ap-
proach, we use CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) (https:
//www.w3.org/TR/cors/) to retrieve the content of JavaScript file
in a string. Because CORS allows cross-domain communication
based on the XMLHttpRequest object, we can retrieve either
local files or any cross-domain remote file in the same way.
We then create a new Function object with the retrieved
JavaScript content. We then push the assigned principal p to a
local protected stack (simply implemented as an array), execute
the function, and pop the stack after the execution is complete.
B. JavaScript APIs Mediation
We provide a mechanism for the developer to moni-
tor JavaScript APIs including the DOM/HTML5 APIs and
JavaScript bridge APIs. We implement this monitoring mech-
anism by intercepting corresponding API calls so that any
invocation to these APIs will be dispatched to the monitor. The
monitor will invoke the policy engine to determine whether
to allow the invocation. This mechanism is inherited from
prior work [32], and depicted in Fig. 2. We note that we have
advanced the previous work by implementing mediation for
JavaScript bridge APIs and principal-based permission access
control, which does not exist in the state-of-the-art JavaScript
security solutions.
One challenge in this implementation is the complete
mediation of the interception to ensure that JavaScript code can
not access the guarded API directly but through the monitor.
For DOM/HTML5 APIs, this can be archived by capturing
all possible aliases of the guarded API through its prototype
inheritance chain in the monitor. There have been several known
vulnerabilities in JavaScript that can be exploited in JavaScript
interception implementation [25], [22]. We apply the secure
wrapper implementations in the literature [22] to ensure that
our monitor implementation is tamper-proof from potentially
malicious code.
For JavaScript bridge APIs, there might be several different
APIs provided by various plugins (JavaScript libraries) to access
a device resource. As the app developer includes plugins to
her app, she knows the specific APIs to intercept and enforce
policies. Each JavaScript bridge API typically uses an internal
function call to interact with the native API. For example, in
Cordova, exec is the internal function to interact with Java API.
To ensure that JavaScript code loaded by our framework cannot
interact the native APIs directly, we also need to intercept this
internal function.
Principal Propagation in Event Handlers and Dynamic Code
Generation: Like native mobile apps, hybrid ones are heavily
relied on events such as user touch to trigger its computation. In
our framework, we capture and intercept these event channels
such as addEventListener, attachEvent to wrap the handler
functions so that when the event is fired, e.g., a button is
touched, the handler function is executed under the same
principal of the parent code so that it will be enforced the
same policy for that principal. This approach is illustrated in
Listing 1
The same approach is applied for code generation on
the fly through DOM APIs such as document.write,
Node.insertBefore(..). As inline JavaScript code in HTML
is not allowed by default CSP, we only need to take care new
script node inclusions in the same way of events to ensure that
any code generated at runtime will be executed as the same
principal as the script created it.
C. Policy Management and Enforcement
As illustrated in Fig. 2, an invocation to a guarded API will
be dispatched together with its principal to the corresponding
monitor. The monitor then consults the policy manager; based
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1 var eventguard = function(args, proceed) {
2 var principal = getTopofPrincipalStack();
3 var listener = args[1]; //the handler function
4 args[1] = function(){
5 //wrap the handler function to be executed
6 //with the same principal
7 return execWithPrincipal(principal,listener);
8 };
9 return proceed();//register the event handler
10 };
11 intercept(Element.prototype, ’addEventListener’, eventguard);
12 intercept(Node.prototype, ’addEventListener’, eventguard);
Listing 1: Principal Tracking for event handler
1 {"resources": [{
2 "name": "contacts",
3 "permissions": [{
4 "principal": "local",
5 "read": "true",
6 "write": "true"
7 },
8 {
9 "principal": "trusted.com",
10 "read": "true"
11 }]
12 //...
13 }
Listing 2: A principal-based permission example
on policy definition, the policy manager will decide whether
to proceed the invocation. As briefly outlined in the previous
section, our framework supports principal-based permission
and stateful policies. We design and implement the policy
specification for HybridGuard as follows.
1) Principal-based Permission: We use JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON) to specify principal-based permission for the
device resource access (including DOM and JavaScript bridge
APIs) by any JavaScript code running inside the app. The
device resources are specified as an array of objects inside the
JSON file, and each device resource object has an array of
permission objects of its own. The permissions to access the
device resources are defined by a principal. For each resource,
the app developer can specify which principal can be allowed
to read or write. For instance, Listing 2 illustrates an example
of principal-based permission that allows the local code (loaded
with principal “local”) to read and write on the contact resource,
while allows JavaScript code from “trusted.com” read only
permission. JavaScript code loaded with other principals is
denied access to this resource by default in this example.
This JSON specification can be defined and stored in a local
variable within the monitor code, however, to separate policy
definition from the code, we store it in a local JSON file and
load it using XMLHttpRequest to perform principal-based
permission check for the policy manager.
2) Custom and Fine-grained Security Policy Enforcement:
Principal-based permission can enforce if a principal is allowed
to access a resource; however, it cannot capture and prevent
potential malicious actions such as sensitive information
leakage or UI attacks as we discussed in the motivating attack
examples. In addition to the principal-based permission check,
our framework also allows the developer to define custom and
fine-grained policies such as whitelist specification, stateful, and
history-based policies. These policies can also be generalized in
a specification; however, we leave this for future work. In this
framework, these custom policies can be defined in JavaScript
code. For example, to prevent a potential information leakage,
the developer can define a policy that “after a principal read
the contact list (assume that the principal is allowed to read the
contact list in principal-based permission), it is not allowed to
send any SMS”. This policy is illustrated in Listing 3. We note
that this policy is also principal-based: the principal violating
the aforementioned example policy is denied to send SMS, but
other principals such the first-party code can still be allowed
to send SMS.
D. Security Analysis
As discussed earlier, potential code injections and informa-
tion leakage attacks by the web channels can be eliminated by
the standard Content Security Policy (CSP) in hybrid mobile
apps. Our HybridGuard framework provides an extra layer
of protection on JavaScript code that is allowed by CSP.
As required by default CSP, each JavaScript code must be
defined in a .js file, either first-party or third-party code.
HybridGuard provides a new JavaScript API to obtain the
content of these .js files and executed them under a principal.
This requires the HybridGuard’s code to run before other first-
party or third-party code in the app so that HybridGuard has
the highest priority to control the behaviors of the loaded
code. As described in the implementation, the HybridGuard’s
code and security states are protected within an anonymous
function, which is inaccessible from outside code outside.
Access to JSON policy specification files is prohibited from
unauthorized principals, enforced by the monitor. Therefore, the
integrity of HybridGuard is guaranteed. Adapted the known
techniques from prior work [22], HybridGuard ensures the
complete mediation of JavaScript web APIs by systematically
explores and mediates all their possible aliases and channels
generating JavaScript code on the fly. For JavaScript bridge
APIs provided by hybrid frameworks, we have to manually
identify the possible channels for each API to ensure it is
completed wrapped. As HybridGuard can control the behaviors
of the loaded code, any unauthorized access can be detected
and prevented.
VI. FINE-GRAINED SECURITY POLICIES
As discussed earlier, in addition to principal-based permis-
sion specification, our framework allows hybrid app developers
to define more fine-grained security policies. Implemented as a
reference monitor, our framework supports fine-grained security
policies satisfying safety property of execution, i.e., preventing
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bad things happen. The app developer knows the functionality
of the app, which resources she will request permission from the
user as well as confidential information in the webpage of the
hybrid app. When including third-party code, the developer can,
therefore, define permission for each party through a principal.
In this section, we present some useful policy patterns that the
hybrid app developer can leverage to protect the end-users.
1 var contact_read_policy = function(args, proceed) {
2 var p = getTopofPrincipalStack();
3 if(!principal_permission_check(p,"contacts", "read"))
4 return; //no permission for this principal
5 toggle(contact_read);// update the contact read history
6 if(!bound_check(p, "contact", "read") return;
7 return proceed();//allow the invocation
8 };
9 var sms_send_policy = function(args, proceed) {
10 var p = getTopofPrincipalStack();
11 if(!principal_permission_check(p,"sms", "send"))
12 return; //no permission for this principal
13 if(contact_read) return;
14 if(!bound_check(p, "sms", "send") return;
15 if (!whitelist_check(p, "sms", "send", args[1])) return;
16 return proceed();//allow the invocation
17 };
18 intercept(sms, ’send’, sms_send_policy);
19 intercept(navigator.contacts, ’find’, contact_read_policy);
Listing 3: Example of “no SMS send after reading contact
list”
Resource bounds Policy: In general mobile apps, it is
alarming that apps overuse or abuse the resources by invoking
it a significant number of times [11]. In some scenarios, just
disallowing access to a resource is not an adequate policy. For
example, when including an advertisement code, the developer
needs to allow the advertisement to access the geolocation
resource; disallowing this access might break the functionality
of the ad code. However, the developer might want to limit
the number of times of access to the geolocation resource to
prevent potential information leakage attacks as malicious ads
can periodically read and send out geolocation information.
In HybridGuard, the developer can specify a bound limit
for each resource per principal in each resource access
action policy. We support the app developers by providing
a bound_check(principal, resource, action) function to
update the history of the access and check if it reaches the
bound limit. The use of this function is illustrated in the policies
in Listing 3.
Whitelist Policies: In some scenarios, a principal is
allowed to invoke an API with parameters. For example, to
send a text message, the code need to call sms.send with the
number to be sent together with other parameters. The developer
might want to limit that principal to send to a limited list of
receivers. This might prevent a user’s private information to
be leaked to unwanted recipients. In another example, the
developer might allow a third-party principal interact and
modify only a particular element in the DOM. To support
this, we have implemented a whitelist_check(principal,
resource, action, arg) to check if the argument is defined in
the corresponding whitelist for the action and the principal.
The app developer can invoke this check in the policy for a
certain API call when intercepting that API. An example of
using this function in policies is illustrated in Listing 3.
History-based Policies: A common attack in e.g., mali-
cious advertisements is to read sensitive user data and send it
to the attacker through different channels such as image source.
Although CSP policy can prevent some of these channels so
that the leakage can be limited, there are other channels specific
to a mobile device that are not captured by CSP such as SMS,
and email. The developer can prevent this potential information
leakage by monitoring the access to sensitive information and
preventing some certain APIs that is not captured by CSP. For
example, the developer can define a policy “no SMS sending
after contact list is read” by intercepting the contact read action
and toggle the contact read flag, which can be checked in the
policy for SMS send: if the flag is toggled, the SMS send
action is disabled. This whole policy is defined in Listing 3.
Custom Policies: There are several potential malicious
behaviors of third-party JavaScript code such as manipulating
the DOM and create UI attacks such as touchjacking (e.g., by
creating an invisible iframe) or open a webpage to launch a
phishing attack. In our framework, in addition to the supported
policies presented above, the app developer can implement any
custom policies in JavaScript when intercepting HTML5/DOM
APIs and JavaScript bridge APIs. In the touchjacking example,
the developer can enforce a policy that disables the creation
of an invisible iframe.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our experi-
mental evaluation. We have developed the core framework
within a JavaScript program inside an anonymous function
(function(){ /* code */})(); so that its code and security
states can be protected. The interception implementation and
policy engine are combined within this anonymous function
comprising of ~800 lines of JavaScript code. To deploy our
framework in a hybrid app, the developer just need to copy
this library together with the JSON permission specification
file to the www folder of the app, then include it (use
e.g., <script src="HybridGuard.js"></script>) to the main
HTML page, e.g., index.html right after the core JavaScript
library of the hybrid app (e.g., cordova.js in the case of
Cordova app). As introduced earlier, to include a JavaScript
program (in a file, local or remote) the developer can use
our API loadJSwithPrincipal(principal,url); to load and
execute code under a principal, instead of including these
programs as the conventional way of <script> tag. This loading
code can be implemented in a separated JavaScript file after
<script src="HybridGuard.js"></script>) or can be placed
at the end of "HybridGuard.js" file outside the anonymous
function. After assigning principals for different JavaScript
files, the developer can edit the policy JSON specification file
to define fine-grained permission for each principal. To evaluate
the effectiveness of HybridGuard, we have tested it within a
153
hybrid app developed by ourselves, and have deployed it to
several real-world Android apps from Google Play.
A. Testing on self-developed hybrid mobile app
We use Cordova framework (version 5.3.3) to develop the
testing app. We include several resource plugins listed in
Table I such as SMS, email, contacts, camera, geolocation,
accelerometer, File System and develop their functionality in
local JavaScript files, and load them with “local” principal using
loadJSwithPrincipal("local",<js-file>);. We also host simi-
lar JavaScript files remotely and load them with “remote” prin-
cipal using loadJSwithPrincipal("remote",<remote-js>);.
We specify the principal permission in the JSON file to
allow/disallow some access to the resource by a principal. We
have performed several minor modifications in the policy code
to make it consistent with the plugins and policies. All policies
introduced in the previous section have been implemented.
We use Cordova to build the app for both Android and iOS
platforms. For Android, we deploy the app directly to real
devices Nexus 5X and Nexus 6P running on the Android 7.1.1
(Nougat). For iOS, we use Xcode (version 7.2.1) to build and
deploy the app to an iPhone 6s Plus iOS 9.2 simulator. We turn
on the debug messages so that we can observe the principal
propagation is tracked correctly. The permissions to the device
resources are checked at runtime correctly based on principal.
Fine-grained policies such as information flow and history
based policies are soundly enforced. We note that Cordova
has been used for our testing; however, as HybridGuard is
developed in JavaScript, it can be easily adapted and applied for
other hybrid mobile frameworks with some minor modifications
in the enforcement and policy code.
TABLE I: List of Policies Enforced on Plugins
Resource PlugIn and Resource object Method Policy Enforced
Files cordova-plugin-fileObject : window.requestFileSystem requestFileSystem
Whitelist
History-based Policy
Camera cordova-plugin-cameraObject : navigator.camera getPicture No Send after read
Contacts cordova-plugin-contactsObject : navigator.contacts find
Whitelist
History-based Policy
Resource bounds policy
Accelerometer cordova-plugin-device-motionObject : navigator.accelerometer
getCurrentAcceleration
watchAcceleration Whitelist Enforcement
SMS cordova-sms-pluginObject : sms send
Whitelist
History-based Policy
Resource bounds policy
Geo Location cordova-plugin-geolocationObject :navigator.geolocation
getCurrentPosition
watchPosition
History-based Policy
Resource bounds policy
Video Recording cordova-plugin-media-captureObject : navigator.device.capture
captureVideo
captureImage Whitelist
Secure Storage cordova-plugin-secure-storageObject : cordova.plugins.SecureStorage
SecureStorage
SecureStorage.get
SecureStorage.set
History-based Policy
Whitelist
B. Testing on real-world Android hybrid apps
We have performed a small-scale evaluation on real-world
Android hybrid apps by manually download some Android
apps marked as a hybrid app from Google Play using
apkpure.com. We use a reverse engineering tool apktool
(https://github.com/iBotPeaches/Apktool) to decode resources
to nearly original form (use e.g., apktool decode -f -s
apkFile.apk). We include the framework library, i.e., Hy-
bridGuard.js and permission JSON file to the www folder,
and modify the main page to include the library and load the
core scripts. Similarly, in the testing app, we also do some
minor modification in policy code to adapt the APIs. After the
modifying the web in the www folder, we rebuild the app using
the apktool (use e.g., apktool build modifiedApkFolder/).
The app is then signed using jarsigner (use e.g., jarsigner
-verbose -keystore your.keystore modifiedApkFile.apk)
and is installed on the device.
We have downloaded ten hybrid application apks from
Google Play through apkpure.com and modified them by
manually including HybridGuard framework as described above.
A few apps that have been tested successfully are Parked Car
Locator, Web Ratio, Remote SMS Control, Graded, Fan React,
My Car Navigator. These applications access various system
resources like Camera, Geo Location, Accelerometer, Contacts,
or File System. Policies like limiting the access to resources or
send messages and location details only to whitelisted sources,
blocking SMS and email sending as soon as a content from a
file is read have been enforced. The tested apps will enforceable
security policies are listed in Table II.
TABLE II: List of tested hybrid mobile apps
Application Name Resources Accessed Policies
Parked Car Locator Geo Location Whitelist Enforcement
My Car Navigator Geo LocationAccelerometer
Whitelist Enforcement
Resource bounds policy
Fan React ContactsSMS
Whitelist Enforcement
History-based Policy
Resource bounds policy
Graded
SMS
Contacts
File System
Whitelist Enforcement
History-based Policy
Resource bounds policy
Remote SMS Control
SMS
Contacts
File System
Resource bounds policy
Whitelist Enforcement
History-based Policy
Web Ratio ContactsFile System
Whitelist
History-based Policy
Resource bounds policy
C. Performance
We have not yet tested the performance and overhead of our
framework, however, when testing the app, we did not notice
any significant delay. Prior work on JavaScript interception
have reported that the overhead of these implementations is
not significant [31], [37], [30], [24], [32].
VIII. RELATED WORK
A. Third-party JavaScript Isolation
There are various proposals in the literature to protect against
malicious third-party JavaScript, e.g., [16], [31], [37], [1], [20],
[21], [24], [30], [32], [40]. However, adapting these solutions to
hybrid mobile app environment is not a trivial task since there
are many phone-related resources and channels are not captured
by the existing approaches. Several proposed methods such
as [1], [31], [30] could be applied but required signification
modifications to capture these phone resources and channels.
Furthermore, none of these solutions provided principal-based
permission for mobile apps as we propose in HybridGuard.
JaTE [37] uses Proxy in ECMAScript 6 to isolate third-
party JavaScript with principals, however, Proxy has not
yet supported in embedded browsers in mobile platforms
(c.f. https://kangax.github.io/compat-table/es6/, March, 2017).
Approaches like Adsafe [16] can be applicable, however, it
must be extended with JavaScript bridge APIs and it requires
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third-party JavaScript written in their JavaScript subset. In
contract, HybridGuard allows the full set of JavaScript and
bridge APIs provided by frameworks. ConScript [24] requires
browsers to be modified to enforce security policies. In this
case, the base mobile platform must be also modified; therefore
it limits the deployment of the protection. HybridGuard does
not require the modification of browsers, hybrid frameworks,
or the base platforms.
Adjail [20] and Webjail [40] use iframes to isolate third-
party content and provide a mechanism for cross-platform
interaction. However, these works cannot project against attacks
for JavaScript bridge APIs in hybrid apps because they are
accessible for any JavaScript code allowed to load in a hybrid
app.
B. Hybrid Mobile Application Security
The closest related work to HybridGuard is PhoneWrap [11],
which introduced a fine-grained ticket-based policy enforcement
into web-based mobile apps to control a bounded number of
accesses for each resource based on the user’s interaction with
the app. Resource accesses through JavaScript interfaces are
wrapped by a library, inspired by “self-protecting JavaScript”
approach [32]. However, PhoneWrap does not investigate
a multi-party scenario in web-based apps, and thus cannot
define and enforce separate policies for different origins
as we proposed in this work. POWERGATE [13] is an
access-control mechanism for Web-based system applications
where the developers can define principal-based access control
policies similar to our work. However, in contrast to the
policies implemented by POWERGATE which simply “allow
or disallow” a particular native object for each principal
such as “local code”, “third-party remote code”, HybridGuard
can enforce stateful policies for multiple principals on each
native object. In addition, the implementation of POWERGATE
requires the modification of the base system e.g., Firefox OS.
In [19], a fine-grained access control mechanism for web-
based mobile apps in Android, using frame-level access control
has been proposed. A permissions attribute is introduced
for the iframe tag used in WebView to specify the device
resources the frame has access to. It also introduces an access
tag that can be added to the Android manifest file to specify
resource access permissions to different origins. However, this
approach is specific to Android as it requires the modification
of the Android base system [19]. In contrast, our approach is
at the web layer, therefore it can be applicable to any mobile
platform without modification.
Another study proposes a context-aware permission control
system for web-based mobile apps [36]. This system can
enforce information flow policies to prevent the potential data
breach in web-based mobile apps. A page-level access control
mechanism has also been proposed in the past, which provides
a particular page access only to the device resources it requires,
to minimize the attack surface [35]. However, the solution is
only applicable to multi-page web-based mobile apps.
Draco [39] provides uniform and fine-grained access control
for web code running on Android in-app browsers. It provides
a declarative policy language for developers to define their
own fine-grained access control policies for multiple origins
and also provides the Draco runtime system (DRS) to enforce
these policies at runtime. However, the implementation the
framework modifies the Chromium Android System WebView
app.
RestrictedPath [33] enforces access control at both the
browser-level and at the system-level. Developers first define
intended paths of their apps; RestrictedPath subsequently
monitors all invocations made by the apps and determines
whether the app deviates from its intended path [33].
Several solutions focus on detecting code-injection attacks
in hybrid mobile apps. Jin et al. introduce the possibility of
code-injection attacks in hybrid mobile apps through non-
web channels peculiar to smartphones. These channels include
the camera in the form of a barcode scanner, SMS, Contact
List, Calendar, NFC and even Wi-Fi access points [18].
DroidCIA [7] extends the previous work and introduces a new
code-injection channel, where a malicious script can be injected
by using the HTML5 textbox input type along with doc-
ument.getElementByID(“TagID”).value [7]. Xiao et al.
introduce a new type of code-injection attack, where JavaScript
code is encoded in a human-unreadable format [41]. The
authors use machine learning algorithms to detect vulnerable
apps and also suggest an improved access control model that
uses a combination of page-based and frame-based techniques.
However, such code-injections can be mitigated by the use of
CSP and not allowing the execution of inline scripts. Our work
focuses on attacks that cannot be mitigated by CSP.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have presented the design and implementation of Hybrid-
Guard, a robust framework to specify and enforce principal-
based and fine-grained security policies to guard against attacks
in hybrid mobile apps originating from third-party JavaScript.
Our enforcement framework is platform independent as it is
developed in JavaScript; thus it can be deployed on various
mobile platforms and hybrid development frameworks without
modifying them. We have demonstrated the implementation of
the policy engine and specification of the principal-based and
fine-grained policies. We specify a wide range security policies
that the app developer can use to mitigate potential attacks.
We have conducted experiments to evaluate the framework and
policies on real hybrid apps and mobile devices.
Our in-scope threats come from potential malicious third-
party JavaScript code in a hybrid app that a developer explicitly
includes; therefore, our framework relies on developers on
defining security policies. In practice, the app users might be
in a right position to define desired security policies to protect
themselves. In future work, we also plan to extend the policy
system so that the app users can specify their policies on a
hybrid app. We also plan to construct a testbed of hybrid apps
and an ontology of possible attacks so that we can conduct a
large-scale evaluation of real-world hybrid apps and effective
security policies.
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